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Pension Funding and Saving
ABSTRACT
This paper suggests that the nature of the funding of defined benefit
pension plans may be an important reason why personal saving has not responded
positively to the high real interest rites and tax incentives to encourage
saving and investment of the last few years. From a firm's standpoint, funding
the promised pension is a target, and higher rates of return permitreaching
that target with lower contributions. According to the Flow of Funds Accounts
of the Federal Reserve System between 1982 and 1984, net pension contributions
declined from 6.02 percent of disposable personal income to4.02 percent.
The paper presents empirical information regarding pension contributions.
unfunded liabilities, interest rates, and recent developments in pension
funding. It specifies the target saving model of pension funding and derives
the theoretical elasticity of pension contributions to changes in interest
rates. It then investigates this elasticity with aggregate time series
econometrics. In general, the estimated elasticities are consistent with the
theory and indicate that one percentage point rise in real interest rates
would, in the long run, reduce pension contributions between 20 and 30 percent.
Such a large negative elasticity for such an important source of loanable funds
in the economy suggests that the pensions funding mechanism should be taken
into account in designing policies to increase the economy's saving and
investment.
B. Douglas Bernheim John B. Shoven
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Stanford University Stanford University
452 Encina Hall Encina Hall, 4th Floor
Stanford, CA 94305 Stanford, CA 94305I. Introduction
The private saving rate in the United States in 1984 has to be considered
disappointing. After the enactment of a large number of policies to make
investment/saving more rewarding (such as liberalized Individual Retirement
Accounts and Keough Plans, the special tax treatment of some reinvested divi-
dends, capital gains taxes which have been reduced twice in the past six years,
and certainly increased investment incentives at the corporate level), the
preliminary BEA estimate for the 1984 personal saving rate is 6.1 percent of
disposable personal income. This is lower than the average personal saving
rate in the 1970's of 7.3 percent. and only imperceptably better than the 6.0
percent of the first four years of this decade. With all of these incentives,
plus a robust economy and record high real interest rates, why was the personal
saving rate so low? We are not going to attempt to answer this general ques-
tion here. Rather, we suggest that personal saving needs to be examined in a
dissagregated manner. Some of the policies just mentioned do not really provide
incentives to save at the margin, but only serve to channel the existing quantity
of saving or wealth through particular vehicles. Undoubtedly, this accounts
for at least some of the apparent sluggishness in private saving. Our topic,
however, is the behavior of personal saving which results from the funding of
pension plans. In this country, most covered workers participate in defined
benefit plans, where the promised pension annuity is based on years of service
and the level of compensation, •nd not directly on the funding status of the
plan or the return on the investments which have been previously acquired to
fund the plan. However, while the worker may be able to separate his or her
accumulation of pension rights or wealth from the funding of the plan, it is
the aggregate funding contributions less outlays (i.e. benefits) which con-
stitute a component of personal saving, and which generate loanable funds
to finance investment or government deficits. Thus, the structure of defined
2benefit plans may produce a divergence between the apparent saving of workers
through the accumulation of pension rights and the actual creation of loanable
funds through net contributions to pension plan reserves.
This can be an important phenomenon if only because pension funds are so
large relative to financial markets and because pension contributions constitute
such a large fraction of personal saving. Also, net corporate pension contri-
butions fell sharply in 1984. They amounted to 4.02 percent of personal
disposable income in 1984, down from 6.02 percent in 1982. Thus, the decline
in pension funding is possibly large enough to be responsible for the
disappointing level of aggregate personal saving.
To understand why corporate pension contributions dropped so significantly
in 1984, one simply has to examine the defined benefit pension contract from
the firm's point of view. The liability of the firm is to pay for retirement
annuities for its vested workers. To calculate the present value of this
obligation, the firm typically predicts the magnitude of those annuities
(making some assumptions regarding wage growth until retirement, labor
turnover, etc.) and then discounts the future obligation to the present using
an assumed interest rate. The resulting present value of liabilities is then
compared to the value of the assets in the plan to arrive at the net unfunded
liability. By law, contributions are related to the unfunded liability of the
plan, although the companies have substantial discretion both as to the speed
with which unfunded liabilities are amortized and in the assumptions which are
made in arriving at the value of unfunded liabilities. However, the key point
is that from the company's point of view, the funding of pension liabilities is
a target —andthe higher the earnings of the assets funding the plan, the
lower the contributions needed to meet the obligations. If the assets earn
more than the assumed discount rate used to value the liabilities (or if the
3assumed interest rate is raised or theassumed rate of growth ofwages is
lowered), the unfunded liability will bereduced (or, more relevantly formany
companies, become negative) and the contributionswill tend to decline. In the
not—so—rare case (in 1984) of an over—fundedplan, the law may force a reduction
or an elimination of contributions, lust the
factors which have been hailedas
the economic achievements of thepast few years (e.g. a rising stock market and
a reduction in wage inflation), combined withthose high real interest rates
which may encourage other kinds ofsaving, are the primary reasons behind the
reduction in the number of underfundedplans and the sharp drop in pension
contributions. As with the classic targetsaving examples, defined benefit
pension contributions have a negative elasticity withrespect to (real)
interest rates, With pension contributionsso large a part of total personal
saving, the negative elasticity of thiscomponent may significantly offset the
positive responsiveness of other components ofsaving. We have not investigated
whether the private sector offsets this reductionin the contributions to
pension plans, but previous researchsuggests that this offset will only be
partial (Feldstein and Selignan (1981), Feldstein andMorck (1983), Bulow,
Morck, and Summers (1986)). It should beemphasized that the negative elasticity
of contributions to a defined benefitpension plan is not the result of inter—
temporal optimization on the part of either the firmor the workers, but is a
purely mechanical response inherent in the funding rules forthese types of plans.
In the next section of thispaper, we present some empirical information
regarding pension contributions, unfunded liabilities,assumed interest rates,
and recent development, in pension funding. Thenin the third section of the
paper, we present our target saving model of pension funding and derivethe elas-
ticity of contributions to changes in interest rates. The fourthsection
4presents our econometric estimatesof aggregate contributions as a function of
lagged interest rates, inflation rates,the pattern of wage growth, and the
behavior of the stock market. We close the paper bysummarizing our findings
in the conclusion.
II. Institutional Considerations
As Table 1 shows, most pension plans (72 percent ofthem) are defined
contribution. However, the defined contribution plans are typicallysmall and
often supplement a defined benefit plan (a notable exception beingflAA—CREF.
which is the largest pension plan in the United States). Thus,in terms of
participants or assets, defined benefit plans dominatewith about 70 percent of
the total. To gain some appreciation of the aggregate sizeof private pension
plans, note that the 52.4 million covered workers representabout 53 percent of
all civilian employees in 1978 and the the *377 billion in private pension
assets amounts to 51 percent of the equity holdings ofhouseholds in 1978. If
government pensions were included, the FederalReserve Flow of Fund figures
show 1978 pension assets at *593 billion compared to household corporateequity
holdings of *741 billion.
Table 2 shows the number of new plans qualified and terminated by typefor
the years 1974—84. Prior to this period, defined benefit planshad been
growing more rapidly. In every year from 1956 to 1974.the number of new
defined benefit plans exceeded the number of new defined contribution plans.
However, since ERISA the pattern has been reversed. In the first three quar-
ters of 1984, the number of defined benefit terminations was at arecord level
and the net growth in defined benefit plans was running at under a one percent
yearly rate. The changes in the relative popularity of definedbenefit vs.
defined contribution plans is almost certainly due to the funding, vesting, and
insurance requirements of ERISA for defined benefit plans.
5TABLE 1
Basic Characteristics of Private Pension Plans,
By Type of Plan 1978
Defined Defined
Benefit Cont. Total
Plans (#) 139.340 356.505 495,845
(28.1%) (71.9%)
Participants 36.1 til 16.3 nil 52.4 mu
(68.2%) (31.1%)
Assets (Market Value) 272.7 bil 104.5 Ml 377.2 bil
(72.3%) (27.7%)
SOURCE: Estimates of Participant and Financial Characteristics of Private
Pensions Plans, 1983, DOL
6TABLE 2
Number and Growth of Pension Plans by Type
Defined
Benifit Defined Benefit Plans
Defined Defined Qualified
Benefit Benefit Minus Total Growth
Tear Qualified Terminated Terminated Number Rate
1974 128,255
1975 6.235 2,953 3,282 131,537 2.6%
1976 4,475 5.860 (1,385) 130,152 1.1
1977 6.953 5,337 1,616 131.768 1.2
1978 9.728 4.625 5,103 139.340 5.7
1979 15.755 3.267 12,488 157.639 13.1
1980 18,849 4.297 14,552 179,424 13.8
1981 23,789 4.536 19,253 198,677 10.7
1982 28,189 5,043 23,146 221,823 11.7
1983 22,130 7,230 14,900 236.723 6.7
84Q1—Q311,053 7,566 3.487
Defined
Contribution Defined Contribution Plans
Defined Defined Qualified
Contribution Contribution Minus Total Growth




1976 21,454 10.053 11.401 301,705 3.9
1977 28,463 10,478 17,985 319,690 6.0
1978 55,956 10,661 45,295 356,505 11.5
1979 41,122 7,574 33,548 381.112 6.9
1980 50,493 8,982 41.511 410.469 7.7
1981 57,748 8,906 48,842 459.311 11.9
1982 57,162 10,108 47,054 506,365 10.2
1983 42,089 11,417 30,672 537,037 6.1
84Q1—0324,360 9,321 15,039
DOL Universe 1977—80 with estimates for other years based on IRS Data.
Data provided by the Employee Benefit Research Institute.
7There are two sources of data regarding aggregate private pension contri-
butions and benefits, the Flow of Funds data of the Federal Reserve and the
National Income and Product Account (NIA) information. As with totalsaving
figures, the two sources do not agree particularly well on the numbers. The
time series on net contributions (contributions less benefits paid out) from
theFlow of Funds information is shown in Table 3 for 1948 through 1984. 1984
numbers show a fairly drastic decline. The 1984 figure for private pensions
alonewas more than 430billion less than for 1982.The growth rate in net
contributions is also down, though less dramatically, for pensions managed by
insurance companies and state and local government pension systems. The
magnitude of the drop in net contributions from a trend line is comparable to
the total inflow of money into IRA and leough accounts. Thus, the data makes
it appear that the story maybelarge relative to the saving incentives
mentioned in the introduction. The relative importance of pension contributions
to personal saving can be Judged by comparing columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.
The MA data, which we use in the empirical work of the next section, is
shown inthefirst two columnsof Table 4 for private pensions. The NIA
providesseparate information on contributions and benefits paid and we gener-
ally consider it to be more reliable than the Plow of Fund numbers. The NIA
contribution figures are based on business tax return information, while their
numbers for benefits are based on individual tax returns netted out for
government pensions. The MAinformationis not yet available for 1984, so our
estimations of the section IVwillnot use the dramatic developments of last
year. The third column of Table 4 contains information on reversions.
Reversions have received a lot of attention recently, partly due to the fact
that a few large publicly held companies have terminated their plans in this
manner. A pension plan reversion can occur when the plan becomes overfunded.
Theexistingplan is terminated and a new plan (usually a defined contribution
8TABLE 3
Net Contributions to Pension Funds ($Billion)
(Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve)
NIA
Personal
Year Private Insured State/Local TOTAL Saving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1948 0.6 0.6 0.4 1.6 11.2
1949 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.7 7.5
1950 1.7 0.8 0.7 3.2 11.8
1951 1.1 1.0 0.8 2.9 16.0
1952 1.7 1.1 1.0 3.8 17.3
1953 1.9 1.1 1.3 4.3 18.6
1954 2.0 1.2 1.5 4.7 17.0
1955 2.3 1.3 1.3 4.9 16.3
1956 2.7 1.2 1.3 52 21.3
1957 3.0 1.6 1.7 6.3 22.4
1958 3.1 1.5 1.8 6.4 23.6
1959 3.7 2.0 1.9 7.6 21.1
1960 4.0 1.3 2.2 7.5 19.7
1961 3.9 1.4 2.4 7.7 23.0
1962 4.2 1.4 2.4 8.0 23.3
1963 4.3 1.7 2.6 8.6 21.9
1964 5.5 2.0 3.0 10.5 29.6
1965 5.4 2.1 3.3 10.8 33.7
1966 6.9 2.1 4.2 13.2 36.0
1967 6.6 1.5 4.1 12.2 44.3
1968 6.5 23 4.8 13.6 41.9
1969 6.3 3.1 5.5 14.9 40.6
1970 6.9 2.9 6.4 16.2 55.8
1971 7.1 4.6 6.6 18.3 60.6
1972 11.5 4.4 8.5 24.4 52.6
1973 14.1 5.7 9.5 29.3 79.0
1974 21.5 6.0 9.7 37.2 85.1
1975 23.1 8.7 11.3 43.1 94.3
1976 18.9 15.0 12.9 46.8 82.5
1977 23.1 16.8 15.9 55.8 78.0
1978 28.8 19.1 20.7 68.6 89.4
1979 40.8 19.4 16.2 76.4 96.7
1980 48.9 22.3 26.5 97.7 110.2
1981 37.6 29.5 31.0 98.1 137.4
1982 54.3 39.7 37.3 131.3 136.0
1983 47.3 40.2 44.5 132.0 118.1
1984 23.5 40.8 39.3 103.6 ——
9TABLE 4
NIA Data on Private Pension Contributions. Benefits and Reversions
Private Pensi1n Private Pensio! 3 Year Contributions Benefits Paid Reversions
1947 —— —— 0
1948 1.196 — 0
1949 1.262 —— 0
1950 1.713 0.370 0
1951 2.262 0.450 0
1952 2.543 0.520 0
1953 2.861 0.620 0
1954 2.903 0.710 0
1955 3.377 0.850 0
1956 3.757 1.000 0
1957 4.153 1.140 0
1958 4.134 1.290 0
1959 4.771 1.540 0
1960 4.866 1.720 0
1961 4.966 1.970 0
1962 5.442 2.330 0
1963 5.760 2.590 0
1964 6.591 2.990 0
1965 7.646 3.520 0
1966 8.675 4.190 0
1967 9.456 4.790 0
1968 10.717 5.530 0
1969 11.823 6.450 0
1970 13.050 7.360 0
1971 15.108 8.597 0
1972 17.903 10.015 0
1973 20.934 11.235 0
1974 24.218 12.970 0
1975 28.253 14.855 0
1976 32.972 16.651 0
1977 38.764 18.761 0
1978 44.869 21.940 0
1979 48.903 27.272 0
1980 54.242 31.258 0.014
1981 55.831 37.634 0.157
1982 60.387 45.585 0.396
1983 64.821 —— 1.558
1984 —— —— 1.172
SOURCES: 1 and 2, NIPA, "Other Labor Income by Industry and Type." (in bil.$)
3, Pension Benefits Guarantee Corporation (in bil. 4)
10plan) is adopted (often with the old obligations covered by insurance company
annuities). The excess of the value of the plan assets over the cost of the
annuities may revert to the company. The whole procedure is made possible
because assets have previously earned more than the assumed interest rate. The
case which received the most attention was the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Co. which recouped $272.9 million out of its $355.1 million pension fund with a
reversion completed in 1984. The figures in Table 4 show that the aggregate
quantity of reversions is still relatively small, but the growth rate in this
practice has been phenomenal. The reversions already pending in January for
1985 amounted to *1.824 billion, and the figure is likely to go much higher.
Clearly, reversions reinforce the downward pressure on saving created by the
lower net contributions. Reversions and the lower contributions actually have
the same underlying cause. In both cases, assets have been earning far in
excess of assumed discount rates, resulting in many pension funds which are
massively overfunded if market rates were used to discount the pension obli-
gation. Reversions amount •to the company recognizing this profit suddenly,
while most ongoing plans simply reduce contributions over a long period of time.
Pension plans have been slow to adjust their assumed interest rates toward
market rates. The mean assumed interest rate for plans with more than 1000 partici-
pants has climbed from 6 percent in 1980 to 7.2 percent in 1984. as shown below.








SOURCE: "1984 Survey of Actuarial Assumptions and Funding," The Wyatt Company.
11However, this growth in the assumed interest rate has been matched by increases
in the assured salary growth for the seventy percent of defined benefit plans
which project wage increase in determining liabilities. In fact, the spread
between the interest assumption and the wage growth assumption has narrowed
slightly in the past eight years. Since 1976. the average spread has decreased
from 2.3 percent to 1.5 percent.
The adjustment towards market interest rates may be occuring somewhat faster
than the previous numbers indicate, however. A strategy termed "immunization" or
"dedication" has become increasingly popular. A portfolio is said to be immunized
when the cash flow (interest plus principle) generated by the assets matches the
cash flow of the pension liabilities. Dedication is a less precise matching stra-
tegy where the average duration of the assets matches the duration of the liabil-
ities. By structuring the portfolio in these ways, plan managers are protecting
themselves from interest rate risk. A change to a dedicated or immunized portfolio
amounts to suddenly changing the assumed interest rate to the market rate. In the
suddenness of the adjustment, the adoption of these strategies is similar to a
reversion. Total dedications and immunizations amounted to at least Itobillionin
1984. with Ameritech leading the pack with a *2.4 billion asset dedication. Chrysler
participated in a big w.y with a *1.1 billion immunization. The annualized yield
on Chrysler's immunized portfolio exceeds 14 percent. While aggregate numbers
are difficult to come up with, this phenomenon appears to be somewhat larger than
reversions, and certainly it amounts to an added factor dampening pension contri-
butions. One final example of the effect of dedication on contributions is given
by the Western Conference of the Teamsters Union. The Union is in the process
of adopting the strategy for its entire *5.1 billion portfolio. In 1984 it placed
*1.777 billion in dedicated bond portfolios yielding over 12 percent. When it
completes the dedication process, the entire *1 billion of "unfunded liability"
of its pension system will have been eliminated without further contributions.
12Basically, by structuring the portfolios in this manner, actuaries are willing
to raise the assumed interest rate to the market rate, thus dramatically
lowering both unfunded liabilities and contributions.
The effects of high market interest rates and high stock market returns
can be seen by examining the funding status of pension plans. Table 5 shows
the distribution of the ratio of assets to present value of accrued vested
liabilities at the end of 1983 for the Fortune 500 Industrials. Even using the
companies' interest rate assumptions, fully 88 percent were fully funded and 34
percent were more than 50 percent overfunded. If the calculations are redone
with a common 10 percent interest rate, 94 percent are fully funded and almost
70 percent are more than 50 percent overfunded. The overfunding would be even
more massive at true market interest rates which ranged between 13 and 15
percent. The figures of Table 5 were requested by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board Statement No. 36 and did not permit the use of salary growth
projections. Many companies do make these projections in calculating their
unfunded liabilities and to determine contributions. Regardless of method,
however, the funding levels of plans have dramatically improved in the last few
years. Again, on the FASB no—projection basis1 the percent of the Fortune 500
whose assets are at least as much as accrued—vested benefits (with their
discount rates) has climbed from 58 percent in 1980 to 69 percent in 1981. 78
percent in 1982, and 88 percent in 1983. The figures are not available yet for
1984, but a further gain in funding relative to liabilities is most likely.
III. Theoretical Considerations
In the previous section. we described the institutional factors which
largely govern the response of pension fund accumulation to changes in interest
rates. Our next objective is to quantify these effects. The current section
exhibits a simple model of defined—benefit pension plans, for which we compute
13TABLE 5
Distribution of Vested Funded Ratios
For the Fortune 500 Industrials for 1983
With Assumed Interest Rates With 10% Interest Rate
Percent of Companies
Funded Ratio % Accumulated % Accumulated S
200% and above 7% 7% 30% 30%
175%—199% 8 15 18 48
1505—174% 19 34 21 69
1405—149% 10 44 6 75
1305—139% 11 55 7 82
1205—129% 13 68 5 87
1105—119% 10 78 4 91
1005—109% 10 88 3 94
90%— 99% 3 91 2 96
80%— 89% 4 95 2 98
70%— 79% 2 97 1 99
60%— 69% 1 98 1 100
50%— 59% 1 99 0 100
Under 50% 1 100 0 100
SOURCE: "Pension—Related Financial Data in the Fortune 500 Industrials" 1984
edition, Hewitt Associates, Lincolnshire, Illinois.
14theoretical long run, and short run interest elasticities. Although these
calculations provide us with a sense for magnitudes, certain critical
parameters are not institutionally determined. In order to refine our
estimates of these interest elasticities, as well as •to confirm the predictions
of our theoretical analysis, we devote section IV to an empirical analysis of
pension fund accumulation.
Consider a firm which, in period t, accrues new pension liabilities
t_ Lt Lt L —C .t+T'
t . ... . . whereL÷ is the liability accrued in period t, to be paid in period t+t.
The notion of "accrual" used here corresponds to whatever actuarial convention
is employed by fins under ERISA regulations. Let denote its stream of
previously accrued liabilities:
t__,t t t —'t't+l "''
Here, represents liabilities to be paid in period ti-v. which have been






Note that (r=O) represents the value of pension benefits which the
firm must pay out in period t. Throughout, we will take the stream of real
liabilities as given.
In what follows, for any stream I =(Ii,X1. ...,Xts).
we will denote
the present discounted value of I by
15V(X) XtnI(l+i)t
where I is the nominal interest rate. We will also denote the "duration" of I
by
S
D(I) 'c [V(I) ]
Theduration of I measures its average maturity. We will use to
denote the interest elasticity of Vt(I). The following result will prove
useful:







Thus, the elasticity with respect to the interest rate of the value of a
nominal stream of payments is equal to the negative of the stream's duration.
We note that this is not the conventional interest elasticity expression, but
is approximately the percentage change in value per percentage point change in
the interest rite (precisely, it is the percentage change in value relative to
the percentage change in 1+1). This, of course, is quite a different figure
from the traditional elasticity which would in this case be the percentage
change in value relative to the percentage change in the interest rate. As an
example of the difference, consider a consol which pays one dollar per period
as a perpetuity. Its present value is 1/i and the traditional elasticity of
its value with respect to the Interest rate is —1. The interest elasticity
16that we just defined, which we should perhaps term the sensitivity or
responsiveness of value to interest rate changes, is —1/i.We have chosen to
express our elasticities in this manner only because we find it more natural to
think about a one percentage point move in the interest rate from, say, four to
five percent rather than a one percent change from 4.00 to 4.04 percent.
In this paper, we will be concerned with changes in the teal interest
rate. In order to avoid unnecessary notation, we simply denote every stream in
real dollars, and discount by the real rate. Subsections A and B consider long
run, and short runeffects,respectively.
A. LongRun Effectsof Chanzes in the Real Interest Kate
ERISA regulations permit temporary underfunding and overfunding of pension
plans, but require that the firmfullyfund its liabilities in the long run.
It is. therefore, natural to begin our investigation by considering steady
states, which are characterized by constant interest rates (as well as other
exogenous variables), and full funding of current liabilities. Thus, at time
t, pension assets (Ar) are given by
(1) At =vtbt)
We will assume that, in the long run, the liability profile grows at a
constant rate, g, by which we mean the following:
t t—t' t' Lt =(1+g)Lt,
Note that this assumption places no constraint on the shape of the new
liability profile Lt, although it does imply that benefits paid, A, and
the value of discounted liabilities, YtO.t), will grow at the rate g. Thus,
pension assets, At. will also grow at this rate.
17In steady state, pension assets always cover accrued liabilities exactly.
Thus, to maintain full funding, current contributions, C, must equal the value
of new accrued liabilities:
(2) Ct =
Betweenequations (1) and (2). we may analyze the steady state effects of a
change in the real interest rate on pension fund contributions and total
capital accumulation, given a fired liability profile.
The assumption of a fired liability profile is essential to our
calculations. Yet ordinarily, we would expect changes in the rate of interest
to be accompanied by changes in wage rates, and perhaps levels of employment.
It is, therefore, important to clarify the nature of our exercise. Ultimately,
one is interested in the general equilibrium effects of any particular policy
change. However, these effects are determined by partial equilibrium
responses. Theinterestelasticity of savings, defined as the response of
savings to a change in the interest rate given fixed values of other variables
(such as wage rates and employment), often appears as a critical parameter in
policy analyses. Consequently, many authors have attempted to measure personal
savings elasticities. Ouranalysisis in the spirit of these earlier studies.
From equation (1), we see immediately that the long runinterest
elasticity of pension fund assets is
s(A) =— Dt(kt)
where, again, this elasticity is the percentage change in the value of assets
for a one percentage point change in interest rates. While we have no data on
the duration of current pension fund liabilities, it is instructive to make
some rough calculations based on hypothetical values. It seems reasonable to
18believe that the duration of outstanding liabilities is in the neighborhood of
15 years. If so, a 1 percentage point increase in the real interest rate would
depress the long run value of pension fund assets by 15 percent. Given the
current size of pension funds, this translates into roughly lioo billion of
capital assets.
A similar calculation for yearly contributions reveals that
c (C ) =— 0(Li) r t t
Here, we clearly see the "target saving" aspect of defined benefit pension
programs: if all savings takes place to fund an expenditure in the following
period (Dt(Lt) =1).then the elasticity of savings is —1. Longer maturity
structures will amplify the effect of interest rate changes. Again, we have no
direct evidence concerning the magnitude of Dt(Lt). However, we can make
suggestive calculations based on hypothetic values. It seems reasonable to
believe that the duration of newly accrued liabilities is in the neighborhood
of 30 years. If so, a 1 percentage point increase in the real interest rate
would depress the long run value of pension fund contributions by 30 percent.
Given current mangitudes, this translates into roughly 125 billion.
Of course, pension funds pay out significant benefits, and earn interest





(where benefits paid, B ).). Our previous calculations reveal howC
changes with the real interest rate. By assumption, B is invariant. For the
remaining term (reinvested interest on assets), we observe that oar elasticity
measure for rA is
19e (rA ) =— fl(Xe) r t r t
Takingr =0.025.and DtOt) =15as before, yields an elasticity of 25. If.
in addition, At =$650billion1 then a 1 percentage point increase in the real
interest rate will, through this channel, bring forth approximately *4 billion
in pension fund savings.
It is useful to suarize the changes in net pension saving relative to
total personal savings. S. Suppose that At/st =4,A/C =8,At/Bt =16,and
r =0.02(these magnitudes correspond roughly to historical averages). Then
C rA i±i —= — a(C ) +—a(rA )
drSt r t r t
.5 a (C ) +.1a (rA r t r t
Using our previous values for stream durations1
=—.5(30)+.1(25)=— 12.5
Thus, in the long run, a 1 percentage point increase in the real interest rate
may depress net pension fund saving by 12.5 percent of total personal saving.
If investors perfectly pierce the corporate veil, then adjustments in
private portfolios will completely offset these changes. However, if the offset
does not occur or is only partial, the impact on private savings elasticities
may be substantial. Of course, partial offsets are much more plausible in the
short run, than in the long run. In addition, unexpected changes in interest
rates are likely to induce short run capital gains or losses on existing assets,
leading to short run pension fund imbalances. It is, therefore, essential to
consider the short run response of pension funds to interest rate changes.
20B. Short Run Effects of Chau&es in the Real Interest Rate
Consider a pension fund with certain assets and liabilities. Suppose that
there is an unanticipated change in the real interest rate during some period.
flow does the accumulation of pension fund assets respond in each successive
period? We find it useful to divide this question into two parts. First, how
would the magnitude of unfunded liabilities respond to a change in interest
rates, if the full impact of this change was recognized immediately? Second,
how do recognition and response lags determine the timing of compensating
adjustments? We tackle these questions in order.
The response of net unfunded liabilities to a change in the interest rate
can be divided into two parts: changes in assets, and changes in liabilities.
First, consider liabilities. The total value of outstanding liabilities is
given by Vt(Xt). We have already calculated that
=— Dt(Xt),
and have argued that 15 is a reasonable hypothetical value for DtOt). Thus,
an increase in interest rates, if recognized immediately, generates a large
decline in the value of outstanding liabilities, thereby tending to make plans
overfunded.
Next, consider the effect of interest rates on fund assets. Assets can be
decomposed into three categories: bonds, physical capital, and stock (levered
physical capital). It is straightforward to calculate the effect of interest
rites on the value of bonds. Suppose that, in period t, the pension fund
contains bonds which provide a claim on the real income stream
t_It t B —Bt+l
21(B4 represents the income from bonds in period t+c which the firm owns as
of period t.) Then, as before, for our elasticity measure,
(Be) =— D(gt)
r t
Again, we have no direct evidence on the average maturity of bonds held in
pension plans. While we have noted the recent trends to "dedication" and
"imnnication" (section II), we suspect that most plans hold bonds with short
maturities relative to their liabilities. Bor purposes of hypothetical
calculations, we will assume tbat the duration of bonds held in pension plans
is 5 years. Thus, an increase in interest rates gener.tes a significant
decline in the value of bonds, thereby tending to make plans underfunded.
The case of physical assets is somewhat more complicated. Specifically.
the effect of interest rates on physical asset valuation depends critically
upon whether a change in interest rates represents a change in the return on
existing units, or a change in the return on marginal units only. We consider
these cases separately.
Case 1: Change in return on all existing units.
In this case, the higher discount is matched by higher returns, so
tr
(y(pt)) =
(ptrepresents the stream of returns associated with physical assets held by
pension plans in period t.)
Case 2: Change in return on marginal assets only.
In this case, a physical asset is indistinguishable from a bond, so
(y(pt)) =— n (pt)
r t
22Since real physical assets often include items such as real estate, for which
durations are quite long, we choose as our hypothetical value Dtu)t) =10.
Thus, in case 2, an increase in interest rates generates a large decline in the
value of real physical assets, again tending to make plans underfunded.
Stocks can be thought of a levered physical assets, i.e., as a combination
of bonds and physical assets. To calculate the effects of interest rates on
equity values, we simply combine the preceding formulas appropriately.
Let be the stream of income associated with the physical assets of
firms in which our hypothetical pension plan holds common stocks. Let be
the stream of outstanding liabilities arising from debt contracts of these same
firms. Let denote the stream of equity income:
Et —(1C)(Yt ) t+t —t+tt+t
(Here, C represents the corporate income tax rate.) Let a denote the debt—
equity ratio of these firms:
Vt(Zt)
(1—C) (Vt(Tt) —Vt(Zt))
The effect of interest rates on equity values depends upon whether we are in
case 1 or case 2, as defined above.
Case 1: £(V(Et)) =fl(Zt) r t t
Case 2: a (V (Et)) = (Zt) —(1+a)D(yt) •r t t t
In case 1, an increase in interest rates tends to improve the asset positions
of pension plans holding stocks. In case 2, the effect is ambiguous. For our
hypothetical calculations, we will take a =f, Dt(Zt)
=5, andDt(Yt) =10.
23Now we assemble the various formulas given above. In year t, unfunded







Thus, the change in unfunded liabilities (as a proportion of total liabilities)
resulting from a change in the real interest rate is given by
1+r dU Vt(Bt)






— £ (V(pt)) — (V(Et)) r t
Vt(Xt)
r t
For purposes of calculations, we will assume that pension fund assets are
evenly distributed between bonds, real assets, and stocks. Using the formulas
and hypothetical parameter values listed above, we calculate two predicted
responses of unfunded liabilities to changes in the real interest rate,









Case 2:—= — 5 —
vtt)
dr 6
In both cases, the response of net unfunded liabilities to a one percentage
point change in the interest rate is large.
Now suppose that recognition and response effects were instantaneous ——
capitalizationof the change is immediate; firms quickly switch to new interest
rites for accounting purposes, and ERISA requires firms to fully fund plans at
24all times. Then the instantaneous response of net contributions topension
plans would be enormous. In the more conservative case, followinga rise in
real interest rates of 1 percentage point, contributions would fallby 25
percent of total private savings. Even if adjustments in personal portfolios
offset 80 percent of this, private savings would still fallby five percent.
Of course, the response will not be instantaneous. While theevidence in
section II suggests that interest rates employed for pension planaccounting do
respond to market rates, they do so slowly. By accounting convention, the
historical costs of bonds, rather than their current market valuesare used to
compute pension net unfunded liabilities, so relevant bond values do not
immediately reflect changes in market conditions. Finally, ERISA permits firms
to cover unfunded liabilities over relatively long periods. Thus,we would
expect actual unfunded liabilities to be dissipated over a relatively long time
horizon. Nevertheless, the magnitude of funding imbalances builds in
significant downward pressure on rate of contributions in the short run.
Rather than attempt to flesh out an explicit model of theadjustment
process, we turn directly to empirical evidence. In the following section, we
estimate both the short and long run effects of real interest ratechanges on
the accumulation of pension fund assets.
IV.EmpiricalEvidence
In the preceding sections, we have argued that institutional rules
governing pension funds may significantly depress the response of private
savings to changes in real interest rates, but have offered no direct evidence
to confirm or refute this hypothesis. In this section,we estimate a simple
model of fund accumulation using aggregate time series data. Ourestimates
corroborate the existence and magnitude of the effects described insection
III. However, we must stress that we provide no evidenceconcerning the extent
25of offsetting adjustments in personal portfolios. Several other papers have
investigated the permeability of the corporate pension veil; in this matter, we
use existing estimates as a guide.
A. Estimation Technique
Ourobjectis to estimate the effect of changes in real interest rates on
gross contributions to pension funds, and to use these estimates to compute the
net effect on fund asset accumulation. To avoid problems with scaling, we will
attempt to explain variations in the ratio of current contributions to current
benefits. According to our model, in steady state this ratio is given by
C V (L)
tillt * =( =
Bt
where g(.) is sore function. I is a vector of exogenous variables, and stars
(C)denotesteady state values. The vector I will include the interest rates
wage growth and employment growth rates (this information determines the value
of the function g), and information concerning the shape of new liability
profiles. In steady state, the values of these variables remain unchanged, so
we may omit a time subscript.
Since we do not observe the economy in steady state, it is impossible to
estimate (3) directly. One must explicitly describe the process of adjustment
before implementing the model with aggregate time series data.
As we have remarked in section 111.8, the adjustment to a new steady state
is not instantaneous. Numerous factors induce lagged responses, including
(1) the adjustment of expectations to a change in the current value of
some variable (real interest rates, or the rate of wage growth);
(2) the adjustment of assumed parameters used in pension fund accounting
to changes in actual expectations concerning the corresponding market parameters;
26(3) the revaluation of existing assets (such as bonds) under pension fund
accounting conventions; and
(4) the adjustment of contributions to cover unfunded liabilities under
ERISA regulations. Undoubtedly, there are other sources of lags as well.
Rather than model each separately to allow estimation of a structural model, we
adopt a reduced form specification intended to represent the aggregate effects
of these lags. Specifically.
Ct
C
(4) =g(1) A 1t—t
Notethat if the vector has remained at its current rate since the beginning
of tine, CIBt will assume the steady state value associated with X.
Estimation of this relationship requires several simplifications. First,
we linearize g(.):
g(X) =la
Second, we restrict the lag structure, as follows. We allow 110and to be
estimated freely, and require that the effects of all right hand side variables
thereafter decline at the conon geometric rate, u (a scalar). That is, for t> 2,
Pt =ILt_iu
Formally,it would be easy to allow additional flexibility by estimating (u
without restriction, and requiring geometric decline thereafter. However,
this consumes valuable degrees of freedom. Given the length of our sample
period, we felt that a relatively restrictive specification was essential.
27When theserestrictions are imposed, it is possible to simplify our basic
functional specification, (4), as follows:
Ct ct_i
ç=
a(l—p)+A + ap) +A 1ti"i—IIII) +
Asa practical matter, we will recover estimates of u. and the parameter






Notethat (6) is linear in variables and parameters. Furthermore, (5) implies
no restrictions on the coefficients in (6). Thus, we can estimate (6) using
standard techniques (see below). This will yield an estimate of jidirectly.





Underthe assumption that is i.i.d. and independent of contemporaneous
right hand side variables (interest rates, wage rates, etc.), equation (5) may
be estimated with ordinary least squares. While the second assumption does not
troubleus, thefirst is a serious concern. Specifically, iftheare
autocorrelated, C_1lB_ willbecorrelated with e, and OLS estimates will be
inconsistent.Consequently, wealso estimate (6) with two stage least
squares,instrumenting for C_i/B_i using lagged values of the other
28independent variables. This produces consistent estimates. However,
consistency is highly sensitive to the functional specification. If our
restrictions on the functional form ire invalid (if. for example, the
ui's
decline geometrically after two lags), our instruments will be invalid.
Unfortunately, there are, of necessity, no alternative candidates.
B. Data
We implement the procedure described above with aggregate U.S. time series
data. Our variables and their sources are as follows.
—Annualgross contributions by employers to private pension and
profit sharing plans, as reported in the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) data (see the Survey of Current Business, July issue of each year).
This figure is derived from reporting of contributions on employers' tax
returns. Unfortunately, a breakdown between defined benefit and other plans is
unavailable. The series begins in 1951.
—Thedollar value of reversions to plan sponsors. Data on
reversions have been collected by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
since 1980, before which they were not an important phenomenon.
—Annualcontributions by employers to private pension and profit
sharing plans, net of reversions (Ct =G
—
Re).
Bt —Benefitspaid by private pension and welfare plans, as given in the
NIPA data (see above). This series is constructed primarily from data on
pension income reported on individual income tax returns, and is available
beginning in 1952.
i —Thenominal rate of interest, defined as the average annual rate
paid on Asa long term corporate bonds.
29Vt —Theannual rate of change of wages and salaries for the average
full—time equivalent employee, as measured by the NIPA.
St —Theannual total return (dividends plus capital gains) for the
Standard and Poor's 500 stock index.
Pt —Theannual rate of inflation, as measured by the year to year
percentage change in the GNP deflator.
Each of these rites (i, v,'p)is measured in percentage points, rather
than fractions of unity. We also define the following real rates of interest.







We do not mean these to represent expected real rates in any period. Rather.
they are actual cx post rates. Recall that our specification is designed to
capture various lagged effects, including the adjustment of expectations to
changes in cx post Values.
Note that most of our data predates flISA. While firms undoubtedly had
greater flexibility in funding pension plans prior to federal regulation, we
suspect that most firms gravitated (however slowly) towards full funding.
Presumably, the existence of ERISA will make pension fund contributions more
responsive to interest rates than these data suggest.
30C. Estimates and Interpretation
In this section, we present estimates of equation (6). We toot the vector
of independent variables, I, to include a constant term, the real interest
rate, the real rate of wage—salary growth, the residual real rate of equity
return (see below), and the rate of inflation (for AX. we ommitted the
constant term, for obvious reasons). We constructed the rcsidual rate of
equity return, err. as follows: we regressed the current real rate of equity
return on r. w, and and set er equal to the fitted residuals. Our
justification for this procedure is that we are interested in all direct
indirect effects of changes in r on rates of contributions. If an unexpected
rise in r causes a change in stock values, thereby altering the value of
pension fund assets, which in turn precipitates adjustments in contributions,
this is a legitimate effect.
We estimated two versions of equation (6). In the first, we imposed no
constraints on coefficients. In the second, we constrained the coefficient of
r($) to equal the negative of the coefficient of w(P). In the
long run, it is clearly the difference between r and w which is relevant for
determining pension fund balance. Each version of equation (6) was estimated using
both OLS and 2SLS techniques (see subsection A) on aggregate annual time series
data, from 1952 to 1982 (see subsection B). The results are presented in Table 6
Several aspects of Table 6 deserve immediate comment. Note that the signs
of the coefficients on r. w era. and Pt determine the direction of the long
run effects of these variables on contributions (see equation (7)). Thus, we
see that the long run interest and wage growth effects have the anticipated
signs. In fact, for both instrumented and uninstrumented versions, the
absolute value of the coefficient on r is nearly the same as the coefficient
of w. as predicted, so that imposing this constraint changes the estimates by
31TABLE 6
Estimated Equations
Variable OLS, OLS, ZSLS, 2SLS,
unconstrained constrained unconstrained constrained
constant 0.398 0.460 1.45 1.55
(0.208) (0.168) (0.76) (0.66)
—0.093 —0.097 —0.416 —0.425
(0.035) (0.033) (0.076) (0.066)
Ar —0.013 —0.004 0.153 0.168
(0.043) (0.038) (0.128) (0.113)
Ar
—1 —0.024 —0.021 0.240 0.245 t
(0.048) (0.047) (0.139) (0.134)
0.118 0.097 0.460 0.425
(0.052) (0.033) (0.142) (0.066)
Ar —0.056 —0.046 —0.365 —0.347 t
(0.040) (0.034) (0.102) (0.079)
—0.038 —0.033 —0.230 —0.222
(0.028) (0.026) (0.076) (0.069)
er 0.0076 0.0072 0.029 0.029 t
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.012) (0.012)
—0.0065 —0.0064 —0.021 —0.021
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.009) (0.009)
Aer —0.0029 —0.0027 —0.011 —0.011 t—1
(0.0019) (0.0010) (0.006) (0.006)
p 0.027 0.020 0.062 0.051 t
(0.016) (0.010) (0.060) (0.046)
Ap —0.075 —0.070 —0.210 —0.201 t
(0.036) (0.033) (0.108) (0.100)
Ap —0.053 —0.054 0.003 0.0021 t—1
(0.053) (0.041) (0.135) (0.133)
0.775 0.777 0.343 0.349
(0.057) (0.056) (0.195) (0.189)
Durbin—Watson 2.66 2.68 1.54 1.56
Standard Error0.088 0.087 0.280 0.273
of Regression
32negligible amounts. Note that the inflation rate increases long run
contributions (although the effect is not statistically significant in three
out of four equations). Strictly speaking, this is inconsistent with our model
——therequirement of full funding determines independent of inflation.
However, in practice, firms may have the ability to somewhat over or underfund
plans in the long run. With higher inflation rates, pension funds form a more
desirable tax dodge; hence, contributions may increase with inflation.
Finally, observe that long—run contributions rise with err. although the
coefficient is only marginally significant. In steady state, changes in er
presumably reflect changes in the risk premium associated with equity. Thus,
the corresponding coefficient implies that contributions increase as the risk
premium associated with equity rises. Perhaps this reflects caution on the
part of firms when facing greater variability on earnings from assets.
While one might be tempted to interpret the other coefficients in Table 6
directly, this is potentially misleading. Only the primitive coefficients are
easily interpretable, and thus must be recovered by unscrambling our estimates
using equations (7), (8). and (9). Since we are primarily concerned with assessing
the effects of interest rates on contributions, we recover only those primitive
parameters bearing directly on this issue (g, as'. p, and
These estimates, along with asymptotic standard errors, are presented in Table 7.
To interpret these coefficients, recall our basic specification (equation
(3)). The coefficient measures the long run impact of the real interest
rate on pension plan contributions (with wages fixed, interest rates do not affect
benefits, the denominator). In particular, the OLS estimates indicate that a one
point increase in the real interest rate will depress CtIBt in the long run
by more than 0.4 (40 percent of benefits). If the long run valne of CtIBt is
33TABLE 7
Primitive Parameters
Parameter OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
unconstrained constrained unconstrained constrained
0.775 0.777 0.343 0.349
(0.057) (0.056) (0.195) (0.189)
0 —0.413 —0.435 —0.633 —0.653
(0.089) (0.067) (0.146) (0.129)
0.307 0.334 0.370 0.396
(0.085) (0.057) (0.370) (0.181)
r 0.214 0.239 0.367 0.383
1
(0.048) (0.047) (0.139) (0.134)
34approximately 2, this implies a long run interest elasticity of contributions
* inthe neighborhood of —20.2 SLS estimates imply that the magnitude of this
effect is 50 percent larger. See below for a more complete discussion.
The estimates of and 4indicatea relatively smooth. monotonic
adjustment of CIBt to its steady state value. In the first year following a
one point rise in the real rate of interest, Ct/Bt changes by r +
Forthe OLS estimates, + — — 0.1,which implies a short run impact
elasticity in the neighborhood of —5 (one quarter of the adjustment in CtIBt
occurs in the first year). For the 2SLS estimates, the impact elasticity is
much higher (approximately —13). and a larger proportion of the adjustment
(more than one third) occurs in the first year. Both OLS and 2SLS estimates
imply that just under half of the adjustment is complete by the second year.
Thereafter, ZSLSestimatesimply much more rapid adjustment to the steady state
(compare the values of the i').It is interesting to note that, for the OLS
estimates, —pg, so that the additional flexibility offered
through inclusion of the lagged parameter makes very little difference.
To assess more fully the implications of our estimates, we calculate
implied steady state values of (CtIBt) and (At/Bt) under different interest
rate assumptions. As mentioned earlier, the implied steady state value of
(Ct/Be) is given by substituting values of variables and parameters into
equation (4), where Altis set equal to zero for all r. Obtaining the
implied steady state value of At/Es is only slightly more difficult. Alongany






Again,in this section, the elasticity is the percentage change in
contributions for a one percentage point change in the interest rate.
35Here, Pt represents the rate of return on the pension portfolio. This may
differ from r due to the risk characteristics of this portfolio. Equation




In steady state At÷i/At =1+ g, the growth rite of pension benefits. Thus,
C B B te ts te








Given values of r, w, er, g, and the risk premium associated with pension
funds. (p —r).we can calculate (CtIBt)5 and (At/Bt) through equations (4)
and (11).
The calculations for these steady state contribution and asset ratios are
presented in Table S. We set the variables appearing in our regression analysis
equal to their recent (20 year) historical averages. Columns designated "initial'
refer to an assumed real interest rate of 0.025. Columns libeled final' refer
to an assumed interest rate of 0.015. We take p —r=0.03.and g =0.10.This
assumed rate of real pension benefit growth ray seem quite high, but accords with
historical eiperience. presumably due to the immaturity of most pension programs.
We chose to rake our calculations using the value of g which prevailed for the
sample period, rather than a more "realistic" steady state value, because our esti-
mates may by unreliable in a regime of substantially lower pension benefit growth.
36TABLE 8
LongRunImpactsof Real Interest Rate Changes
a *
Version (C/B) (A/B)
Initial Final % Change Initial Final % Change
Uninstrumented, 2.070 2.475 19.6 24.18 27.04 11.8
Unconstrained
Uninstrnmented, 2.026 2.460 21.4 23.19 26.76 15.4
Constrained
Instrumented. 2.008 2.640 31.5 22.78 30.06 32.0
Unconstrained
Instrumented, 1.982 2.635 32.9 22.19 29.97 34.8
Constrained
37Recall from our theoretical discussion that the (absolute) long run
interest elasticity of contributions should equal the duration of newly accrued
pension liabilities while the (absolute) long run interest elasticity of assets
should equal the duration of outstanding liabilities. Of course, one must
adjust for the fact that approximately one third of plans are not defined
benefit. Nevertheless, all estimates appear to be roughly consistent with the
magnitudes proposed in section III. Only one anomoly appears: for the 2 SLS
estimates, the implied duration of outstanding liabilities slightly exceeds the
duration of newly accrued liabilities. We suspect that our estimates of
(At/Bt)
are not entirely reliable due to the maturation of the pension system during
our sample period, and hope to improve these calculations in further revisions.
V. Conclusion
We are reluctant to draw too many strong conclusions at this relatively
preliminary stage in our research. However, the target saving/negative
elasticity of contributions story for defined benefit pension plans seems to
hang together well in both a theoretical and empirical investigation. Real
interest rates have been at record levels for the past three years and the
effect this has had on pension funding has been considerable. The earnings of
pension assets have been much greater than actuarial assumptions with the
result being that a majority of pension funds are fully funded (even at their
still—below--market assumed interest rates) and net contributions are don over
*30 billion dollars since 1982. Net contributions are likely to remain below
the 1982 level because of the considerable lags in the pension actuarial
system. Such recent and increasingly important phenomena as pension
reversions, dedications, and immunizations also reflect tbe gap between market
interest rates and the previously assumed rates, and reinforce the downward
pressure on loanable fund savings from this source.
38We developed a simple analytical model which suggested that the long run
percentage responsiveness of contributions to a one percentage point increase
in the interest rate should equal the duration of newly accrued pension
liabilities, and the responsiveness of pension assets should equal the duration
of existing liabilities. The OLS and ZSLS aggregate time series estimates of
our empirical section are remarkably consistent with this model.
Pension funds are an important institutional feature in U.S. capital
markets. Their operation can, tad we feel has, affected the way the economy
responds to capital formation incentives. In the future, policies which take
into account the operation of pensions should be investigated.
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